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MERS AND THE MORTGAGE CRISIS: 
OBFUSCATING LOAN OWNERSHIP AND THE 
NEED FOR CLARITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of mortgage foreclosure proceedings has rapidly ballooned 
since the economic crash of 2008.1 In November 2011, foreclosure actions 
were filed against one out of every 579 homeowners throughout the United 
States.2 In some states, such as Nevada, one out of every 175 homeowners 
received foreclosure notices.3 While never simple, the foreclosure process 
in recent years has become increasingly wrought with unsettling 
complications. In the past, local banks handled mortgages,4 and borrowers 
had an identifiable business to consult and even negotiate with in the event 
of a default. In many states today, borrower-homeowners face foreclosure at 
the hands of a little-known company called “Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc.” (MERS).5 MERS claims to hold title to 
approximately 60 million mortgages—half of the mortgages in this 
country6—and yet many borrowers are unaware of its existence until the 
company is removing them from their homes.7 
Adding to homeowners’ confusion, state courts are far from reaching a 
consensus as to whether MERS, a company that tracks mortgage ownership 
but has no actual interest in the mortgages themselves, even has the power 
to initiate a foreclosure.8 While some states are growing ever more 
protective of their consumers by limiting the entities eligible to participate 
in foreclosures,9 others are embracing MERS and allowing the organization 
                                                                                                                 
 1. “Foreclosure notices were filed against a record 2.9 million properties last year, and an 
additional 1.2 million in the first half of this year.” See Craig E. Pollack & Julia F. Lynch, 
Foreclosures Are Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03 
/opinion/foreclosures-are-killing-us.html. 
 2. U.S. Foreclosure Trends and Foreclosure Market Statistics, REALTYTRAC, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2011). RealtyTrac is an online 
marketplace for foreclosure properties and also collects data related to foreclosure for 90 percent 
of U.S. property values. An Introduction to RealtyTrac, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac 
.com/company/backgrounder.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).  
 3. Id.  
 4. See Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and 
Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 729 (2009). 
 5. See Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06mers.html?ref 
=mortgageelectronicregistrationsystemsinc. 
 6. See id.  
 7. See Greg Collard, Local Governments File Suits Against MERS, NPR (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/28/142864277/local-governments-file-suit-against-mers. 
 8. Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1378 (2010). 
 9. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). 
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to foreclose without owning the mortgage.10 MERS not only goes unnoticed 
by many homeowners, but also by federal lawmakers, as national 
legislation currently does not reach the company despite its growing 
reputation for engaging in questionable business practices.11 To provide 
clarity for homeowners and some regulation for this small corporation that 
deals with millions of mortgages, Congress must pass federal legislation 
that clarifies which entities can foreclose on borrowers, compels MERS to 
tell borrowers who owns their mortgage, and places MERS under the 
supervision of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established by the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
Part I of this note discusses local recording systems, how MERS first 
came about, and its original contributions to the mortgage industry. Part II 
identifies and explores the problems with the varied approaches of state 
courts as to whether MERS has standing to foreclose on homeowners, the 
incomplete federal laws regarding homeowner protection, and MERS’s 
recent quasi-fraudulent practices. Part III recommends that Congress pass 
federal legislation that: (1) clearly establishes uniform standing 
requirements for foreclosures among the states; (2) requires MERS to make 
its electronic records of mortgage transfers public and requires disclosure to 
borrowers; and (3) groups MERS with other agencies regulated by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau under the Dodd-Frank Act so that 
individuals in financial trouble have the guarantee of a fairer foreclosure 
process. Finally, Part IV explores alternative means for increased consumer 
protection. 
I. BACKGROUND ON MERS 
Traditionally, under the mortgage system,12 a mortgagor13 borrowed 
money from a mortgagee,14 or lender.15 The mortgagor then acquired the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See, e.g., Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Ct. App. 2011); see 
also Harvey v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 69 So. 3d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Calvo v. 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 11. Karen Weise, A Wall Street Mortgage-Tracking Tool is on Trial, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK: MARKETS & FINANCE, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles 
/2012-10-23/a-wall-street-mortgage-tracking-tool-is-on-trial. MERS is rapidly falling out of favor 
with the big banks that created it. JPMorgan Chase stopped using MERS in 2007 and Washington 
Mutual stopped using the company in 2008. See Eric Dash, Chase Acts to Broaden Foreclosure 
Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/business/14morgan 
.html. Now, MERS is facing adverse legal actions for participating in deceptive trade practices 
from various states, including a subpoena from New York’s and a lawsuit from Delaware’s 
Attorneys General. Bloomberg News, Merscorp Faces Deception Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/business/delaware-suit-accuses-merscorp-of-deception-in 
-mortgage-registry.html. 
 12. Some states use deeds of trust instead of mortgages as means to secure real property. See 
Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), its Recent Legal Battles, 
and the Chance for a Peaceful Existence, 12 LOY. J. PUB. L. 177, 197 (2010) (provided that 
“Southwest Homes involved Jason and Julie Lindsey, who entered into a deed of trust on their 
home to secure a loan”). This note focuses only on mortgages. However, some of the case law 
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house and the mortgagee gained an ownership interest in the property 
through the mortgage documents, which included a promissory note and 
mortgage.16 The promissory note, or simply “note,” obligated the mortgagor 
to repay the debt, and the mortgage put up the property as collateral in the 
event that the mortgagor did not repay the money owed under the note.17 As 
owner of the mortgage loan, the mortgagee or lender received or held these 
documents, which identified it as the owner.18 The mortgagee also serviced 
the loan, which included collecting interest or accepting monthly 
payments.19 If the borrower could not pay his share, the mortgagee 
foreclosed on him,20 often taking back the house.  
Most states have acts requiring that every real property transfer of 
ownership be recorded.21 “Recording” generally entails “deliver[ing] a copy 
of the document in question . . . to a county clerk that time stamps, indexes, 
and files the document.”22 Recording statutes are designed to protect the 
holders of an interest in land.23 Without documenting the transfer of that 
interest, the original holder can re-convey it, with clear title, to another 
person.24 Theoretically, without these statutes and where a transfer is not 
recorded, a person could sell a mortgage to a buyer and then sell it to 
another bona fide purchaser unaware of any prior claim, leaving the second 
                                                                                                                 
discussed throughout this article comes from states that use the deed of trust system, as MERS has 
come under fire in both jurisdictions. The distinctions between the two systems are not relevant to 
this argument, as MERS simply “operates a computer database designed to track servicing and 
ownership rights of mortgage loans anywhere in the United States” but does not “actually own any 
mortgage loans.” Peterson, supra note 8, at 1361. 
 13. See Nolan Robinson, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1625–26 
(2011) (noting that the mortgagor is either the person purchasing the home, or the borrower). 
 14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (9th ed. 2009) (stating that a mortgagee is “one to whom 
the property is mortgaged; the mortgage creditor, or lender”). 
 15. 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.03 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2009). 
 16. Robinson, supra note 13, at 1626.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Holding the note gives the mortgagee the right to enforce the mortgagor’s obligation to 
pay. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: TRANSFER OF MORTGAGES AND OBLIGATIONS SECURED 
BY MORTGAGES § 5.4 (1997). 
 19. Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 262, 262 (2009). 
 20. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 1372 (“Historically, when a homeowner defaults on a home 
mortgage the owner of a mortgage loan, or a servicer hired to collect borrower payments, sues the 
homeowner in a foreclosure action.”).  
 21. POWELL, supra note 15, § 82.01 (“Recording acts . . . require the public preservation of 
written documents of title to land, or of other written evidences of certain proprietary interests.”). 
 22. Peterson, supra note 8 at 1365.  
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 599 (stating recording acts “are designed to 
protect bona fide purchasers from earlier unrecorded interests”). 
 24. POWELL, supra note 15, § 37.27 (stating that because of the recording acts, “bona fide 
purchasers who acquire an interest without notice of a prior claim will be protected from the 
enforcement of the previously existing claim”).  
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buyer with no right to the property.25 If the mortgagee decided to sell the 
loan, he assigned the mortgage to the new mortgagee and usually recorded 
that sale in the county records.26 
During the 1990s, it became increasingly popular to split up mortgages, 
combine the pieces of different mortgages, and sell the repackaged 
mortgage to other mortgagees—in other words, to “securitize” them.27 
Mortgage owners often sold the servicing rights to one entity and the 
ownership of the mortgage to another.28 However, parties to these sales 
generally did not record each transfer at the county clerk’s office because 
recording proved too burdensome due to the number of actors involved, the 
frequency of the transfers, and the speed with which those transfers were 
otherwise executed.29 In the early 1990s, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
other major banks established MERS in order to speed up the recording 
process.30 MERS offered an electronic database to record titles, which gave 
parties a way to expeditiously document the transfer.31 MERS, a private 
company based out of Virginia with only a few employees,32 runs this 
electronic recording system known as “the MERS.”33 
Now, when a MERS mortgage is initially recorded, MERS is the only 
name listed with the county.34 When subsequent transfers are made, they are 
documented in the MERS electronic database instead of with the local 
county records office.35 However, MERS merely operates the database that 
lists these transfers; it does not purchase an interest in the actual 
mortgages.36 Because MERS tracks the mortgages in its database and 
purchases neither an interest in the ownership nor servicing rights to the 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id.  
 26. Robinson, supra note 13, at 1626.  
 27. Phillips, supra note 19, at 262–63.  
 28. Id. at 263.  
 29. Id. “[B]y the 1990s, the centuries-old system of land records was showing its age. Many 
county clerk’s offices looked like something out of Dickens, with mortgage papers stacked high. 
Some clerks had fallen two years behind in recording mortgages.” Powell & Morgenson, supra 
note 5.  
 30. Powell & Morgenson, supra note 5.  
 31. Id.  
 32. “[MERS is a] private corporation . . . with a full-time staff of fewer than 50 employees.” 
Id.  
 33. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2211 
(2007) [hereinafter Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance]. 
 34. Id. at 2212. Note that MERS alleges that it does not replace county records. MERSCORP 
HOLDINGS, INC., MYTHS VS. FACTS: MERS SYSTEM, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., AND MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC. 2 (June 2012), http://www.mersinc.org 
/component/docman/doc_download/48-june-2012-myths-v-facts?Itemid=. However, MERS’s own 
founder conceded that the MERS database does in fact replace the records once MERS is recorded 
at the county, “Because MERS remains the mortgagee of record in the public land records 
throughout the life of a loan, it eliminates the need to record later assignments in the public land 
records.” R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, PROB. & PROP., July–Aug. 1997, at 33 (1997). 
 35. See Phillips, supra note 19, at 263.  
 36. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 1361.  
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loan, the company does not own these mortgages.37 It acts merely as a 
“nominee” for the lender and successor lenders.38 While state courts 
accorded varied meanings to the term “nominee,” Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines the term as “a person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a 
very limited way. . . . A party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of 
others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.”39 In 
theory, only individuals or organizations who actually acquire the rights to 
real property record their name in the local county records;40 in actuality, 
despite lacking ownership title, MERS is listed in the county records as the 
“nominee.”41 
Many hail the invention of MERS as a success for the mortgage 
industry, as it eliminates the need to go through “a terribly cumbersome, 
paper-intensive, error-prone, and therefore costly process for transferring 
and tracking mortgage rights” with the counties.42 MERS expedites the 
mortgage issuing process for both buyers and sellers, and also saves the 
lenders money.43 However, the newer, privately-run electronic system does 
not make public its information about ownership transfers by default, and 
only recently began disclosing such information “as is needed.”44  
Unfortunately, the MERS system has several other downsides. For 
example, only paying members can record in their system and each 
transaction is burdened with a fee.45 Since MERS’s inception, it is 
estimated that the government has lost nearly $1 billion in fees to MERS as 
banks frequently chose to record in the MERS database over those of the 
counties.46 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 1377–78. Peterson lists three reasons why MERS cannot be a mortgagee or owner of 
the mortgage: “First, MERS does not fund any loans. Second, no homeowners promise to pay 
MERS any money. Finally, and most important, MERS is never entitled to receive the proceeds 
from a mortgage foreclosure sale.” Id. MERS’s money is not given to homeowners, and, 
additionally, the promissory note never designates MERS as the payee and MERS cannot accept 
any monthly payments from borrowers. Id. at 1377–78.  
 38. Phillips, supra note 19, at 263.  
 39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 486.  
 40. Phillips, supra note 19, at 263.  
 41. Dordan, supra note 12, at 178.  
 42. Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 
IDAHO L. REV. 805, 808 (1995). 
 43. Phillips, supra note 19, at 263–64.  
 44. Id. at 264. As of September 2012, MERS alleges that it will release loan ownership 
information to homeowners who call a hotline. MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 34 at 1. 
However, this statement is merely included in a MERS company fact sheet, and is not guaranteed 
or regulated by any external entity.  
 45. Peterson, supra note 33, at 2211.  
 46. Adam Leitman Bailey & Dov Treiman, The Brewing MERS Crisis: Everyone Loses, 246 
N.Y. L.J. 5 (2011). Dallas County is currently suing MERS on behalf of itself and all other Texas 
counties to recover recording fees that it claims MERS improperly diverted away from the 
company by establishing its own private recording system. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Dallas Revises 
MERS Filing-Fee Suit to Add All Texas Counties, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/dallas-seeks-to-add-all-texas-counties-to-mers-filing-fee 
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In another example, MERS is not required to notify homeowner-
borrowers when ownership of its mortgages changes hands.47 Creating a 
further barrier to ascertaining loan ownership, homeowners consulting the 
local land records find only the name “MERS” listed.48 In addition, while 
MERS may electronically record transfers of title in its private database, 
some of the actual mortgage notes are themselves left blank and do not 
identify an owner.49 These blank notes can later create problems for the 
foreclosure process.50 For example, state courts51 are split on whether an 
entity that does not own a stake in the actual mortgage, is not listed on the 
documents, and acts only in a “nominee” capacity for the lender52 has 
standing to foreclose on a borrower.53 
II. PROBLEM: NO REAL REGULATION OVER THE RECORDING 
SYSTEM 
Without regulation, MERS and its electronic recording system have 
created three major problems. First, state laws take disparate views on 
MERS’s standing to foreclose,54 so borrowers are impacted in vastly 
different ways based on their jurisdictions. Second, existing federal 
legislation mostly targets predatory lending practices or simplifies loan 
application forms,55 and overlooks the need for disclosure in the recording 
process. For example, lenders must use the same loan application forms 
                                                                                                                 
-suit.html. Similar actions were initiated in counties in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Oklahoma. 
Id.  
 47. Phillips, supra note 19, at 264. The homeowner borrowers must be notified, however, 
when the servicing entity changes pursuant to federal laws. Id. at 263.  
 48. Peterson, supra note 33, at 2212.  
 49. Phillips, supra note 19, at 263.  
 50. “We have long held that a conveyance of real property, such as a mortgage, [in blank] that 
does not name the assignee conveys nothing and is void.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 
N.E.2d 40, 50 (Mass. 2011).  
 51. For example, Massachusetts law requires the foreclosing entity actually listed on the 
mortgage documents execute the foreclosure. See, e.g., id. at 40. In contrast, Kansas started off 
with more stringent foreclosure requirements but has recently changed its laws to better 
accommodate MERS. Contra 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. 
BENDER, LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 12:35 (West 2011). 
 52. Phillips, supra note 19, at 263. 
 53. Compare Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 54 (“If the plaintiffs did not have their assignments to the 
Ibanez and LaRace mortgages at the time of the publication of the [foreclosure] notices and the 
[foreclosure] sales, they lacked authority to foreclose under G.L. c. 183 § 21, and G.L. c. 244 § 14 
. . . .”), with Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009) 
(“[Minnesota] statute provides MERS with the authority to record assignments or power of 
attorney for foreclosure on behalf of its members.”).  
 54. See, e.g., Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 40. Florida, on the other hand, does not have such strict 
rules about foreclosure actions. See, e.g., Harvey v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 69 So.3d 300, 
304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 55. Learn About the Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2011); COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, 
HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 2 (2010), http://www.occ.gov 
/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/hmda.pdf. 
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pursuant to federal regulations,56 but homeowners do not have a guaranteed 
way to determine who owns their loans. Additionally, during the initial 
home buying process, federal consumer protection laws necessitate 
disclosing information to the borrower about fees and interest rates,57 but 
such protections do not require mortgage owners to record their interests. 
Third, the lack of federal oversight has allowed MERS to engage in quasi-
fraudulent practices such as robo-signing.58 
A. DISPARATE TREATMENT BY STATE COURTS 
State courts mandate a wide variety of requirements prior to executing a 
foreclosure. Yet, the United States Supreme Court recently declined59 to 
grant certiorari to a case that would possibly have streamlined these 
requirements and clarified MERS’s standing.60 The vastly different state of 
foreclosure law throughout the country is not only confusing for the 
borrowers at risk of losing their homes, but also problematic for the banks 
and entities, such as MERS, that initiate the foreclosure.61 
Many state courts originally favored MERS in their rulings, but 
recently this trend has reversed with courts increasingly supporting 
borrowers.62 Nonetheless, state court rulings generally fall into three distinct 
categories: (1) a strict foreclosure approach where the foreclosing entity 
must be the one named on the mortgage note prior to executing the 
foreclosure;63 (2) a moderate approach that includes enhanced protections 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Learn About the Bureau, supra note 55.  
 57. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, supra note 
55, at 2.  
 58. Floyd Norris, MERS, Created to Aid Mortgages, Proves Problematic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/business/19norris.html.  
 59. Supreme Court Documents, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search 
.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-195.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 60. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (Ct. App. 2011). Gomes 
claimed that the “lower court stripped [him] of due process by allowing MERS to foreclose 
without ensuring that the registry had the noteholder’s authority to foreclose.” Kerri Panchuk, 
Case Against MERS Reaches Supreme Court, HOUSING WIRE: FIN. NEWS FOR THE MORTG. MKT. 
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/08/17/case-against-mers-reaches-supreme 
-court. 
 61. Parties have looked to the courts for clarification in the foreclosure process, resulting in 
even more cases filed. The massive amount of foreclosure cases have left court dockets so 
overcrowded that “in New York State it would take lenders 62 years at their current pace, the 
longest time frame in the nation, to repossess the 213,000 houses now in severe default or 
foreclosure.” David Streitfield, Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/business/19foreclosure.html. 
 62. MADISON ET AL., supra note 51 at 2.  
 63. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 647 N.E.2d 40, 54 (Mass. 2011) (“If the 
plaintiffs did not have their assignments to the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages at the time of the 
publication of the notices and sales, they lacked authority to foreclose . . . .”). MERS, on the other 
hand, alleges that it in fact has standing in all fifty states. MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra 
note 34 at 1. However various precedents do not fit with MERS’s declaration. See generally 
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., 301 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2009); Bain v. 
Metropolitan Mortg. Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012).  
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for homeowners such as mandatory recording provisions64 or required 
options in the alternative to foreclosure proceedings;65 or (3) a lenient 
approach that allows a variety of entities loosely associated with the 
mortgage to execute a foreclosure.66 
1. Strict Foreclosure Requirements 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has led the way in pro-borrower 
jurisprudence with its highly publicized decision U.S. Bank National Ass’n 
v. Ibanez.67 Though not dealing specifically with MERS, Massachusetts’ 
highest court held that “the foreclosing entity must hold the mortgage at the 
time of the notice and [foreclosure] sale in order accurately to identify itself 
as the present holder in the notice and in order to have the authority to 
foreclose under the power of sale.”68 Where a mortgage note is blank and 
does not list the owner of the mortgage, a foreclosure cannot proceed under 
Ibanez.69 Blank notes, which MERS uses to foreclose on behalf of lenders,70 
cannot be executed by anybody.71 This ruling also prohibits the foreclosing 
entity from filling its name in the blank foreclosure documents and 
backdating them to get standing.72 Any such documents void the entire 
foreclosure.73 Furthermore, any entity that subsequently acquires the 
foreclosed property cannot obtain clear title to that property if the 
foreclosure sale was based on void documents.74 This prohibition applies 
even if the subsequent purchaser was not involved with executing the actual 
foreclosure proceeding.75 The ruling flows from Massachusetts statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735 (2011) (providing a trustee may foreclose if the 
trust deed is recorded); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505 (2011) (requiring the deed to be record in 
the county of the property); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103 (2011) (requiring the mortgage and all 
assignments to be recorded). 
 65. In Nevada, a foreclosing entity must provide the borrower with adequate notice of the 
upcoming foreclosure proceeding and include information that describes the borrower’s option to 
try foreclosure mediation prior to the actual eviction proceeding. See, e.g., Pasillas v. HSBC Bank 
USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1284 (Nev. 2011) (applying Act of June 10, 2011, ch. 306, 2011 Nev. Laws 
388, Sec. 20.7). 
 66. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.3011 (2011) (allowing foreclosures even by an entity that 
improperly possesses the mortgage documents). 
 67. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. “The MERS Rules of Membership require that, when foreclosing in MERS’ name, MERS 
Members must have the note endorsed in blank so that MERS can be the holder.” Sharon McGann 
Horstkamp, MERS Case Law Overview, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 458, 467 (2010). 
 71. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53. 
 72. Id. at 55.  
 73. Id. at 53.  
 74. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 892–93 (Mass. 2011).  
 75. See id. at 892. In this case, the bank improperly acquired the property through a 
foreclosure deed. Id. Bevilacqua then obtained the property through a quitclaim deed and 
proceeded to move into the house, only to have the court determine that he did not in fact own the 
property. Id. at 892–94.  
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law, which requires that the mortgage owner clearly identify himself as the 
owner of the note and publish a notice of the upcoming foreclosure sale in 
the newspaper in order to alert the mortgagors.76 
Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court has issued new interpretations 
that restrict MERS’s power in Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. v. Southwest Homes of Arkansas.77 The court rejected the argument that 
“once [MERS] becomes the agent on a security interest, it remains so for 
every MERS member lender who acquires ownership.”78 Additionally, the 
court held that the trustee must specifically designate MERS as its agent.79 
In this case, the MERS name was not listed on the deed as “trustee,” so 
MERS did not have a legal right to foreclose.80 The court further stated that 
even listing MERS as a beneficiary on the deed of trust does not guarantee 
MERS the power to foreclose.81 In this case, the deed of trust listed MERS 
as a beneficiary, but instead the court found that the mortgage company was 
the beneficiary because the mortgage company actually “receive[d] 
payments on the debt.”82 The Supreme Court of Washington similarly held 
that MERS is not a beneficiary “if it never held the promissory note secured 
by the deed of trust.”83 
On the other hand, in New York, MERS can in theory successfully 
bring a foreclosure action, although it must demonstrate that it had physical 
custody of the note and mortgage at the time the case was commenced.84 
The Appellate Division, Second Department, explained its reasoning, 
“[T]he law must not yield to expediency and the convenience of lending 
institutions. Proper procedures must be followed to ensure reliability of the 
chain of ownership, to secure the dependable transfer of property, and to 
ensure the enforcement of the rules that govern real property.”85 However, 
as a practical matter, a foreclosure by MERS in New York State under this 
                                                                                                                 
 76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. TIT. 3, § 244 (2011).  
 77. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., 301 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2009). 
 78. Id. at 3.  
 79. Id. at 2.  
 80. Id. at 2, 4. It was widely discussed that after Southwest Homes, MERS no longer had 
standing to bring foreclosure actions in Arkansas. Norris, supra note 58. Similarly, after Bain, 
some have argued that MERS may no longer be able to bring foreclosure actions in the state of 
Washington. Connie Thompson, State Supreme Court Rules Against MERS in Mortgage 
Foreclosure Challenge, KOMONEWS.COM (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.komonews.com/news 
/consumer/State-Supreme-Court-rules-against-MERS-in-mortgage-foreclosure-challenge-
166842226.html. 
 81. Sw. Homes of Ark., 301 S.W.3d at 5.  
 82. Id. at 4.  
 83. Bain v. Metropolitan Mortg. Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 37 (Wash. 2012). 
 84. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 41 A.D.3d 674, 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007) (explaining that the note must be “transferred and tendered” to MERS, and the mortgage 
“passe[s] as an incident to the . . . note”). But see Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 283 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“The Court’s holding in Coakley was dependent upon the fact that MERS 
held the note before commencing the foreclosure action.”). 
 85. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d at 283. 
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rule is impossible; as the company writes on its own website, “MERS 
doesn’t hold any documents on behalf of the servicer or investor.”86 
Therefore, when taken together, foreclosure by MERS should be impossible 
in New York if holding notes is a prerequisite and it is against company 
policy to do so.  
2. Moderate Homeowner Protections 
While Nevada courts deem MERS to be a proper foreclosing entity,87 
the state offers borrowers and lenders the chance to pursue mediation.88 
Mediation holds the promise of arranging a feasible loan modification plan 
for both parties89 and hopefully avoids foreclosure altogether.90 Many critics 
fault MERS as an obstacle to loan modification because there is no 
guarantee that it will readily share the identity of a mortgage note’s owner 
with a borrower,91 making negotiation and subsequent loan modification 
that much more difficult. However, sixty days before executing a power of 
sale, Nevada law mandates that the foreclosing entity serve the borrower 
with papers that notify him of his right to participate in Nevada’s 
Foreclosure Mediation Program,92 so that any borrower facing foreclosure 
can exercise his right to negotiate a loan modification. Furthermore, the 
Nevada Supreme Court explicitly ordered that, in order to procure a 
foreclosure certificate, MERS must “(1) attend the mediation, (2) 
participate in good faith, (3) bring the required documents, and (4) if 
                                                                                                                 
 86. MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 34 at 2 (emphasis added).  
 87. See, e.g., Smith v. Cmty. Lending, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (D. Nev. 2011) (finding 
that the court does not take issue with language in a deed of trust stating that “MERS . . . may 
initiate a foreclosure”). 
 88. Whenever a property is sold, the seller must include a form to request mediation upon 
being informed of an upcoming foreclosure for the new homebuyers, as that homebuyer has the 
right to request mediation if he is facing foreclosure. Act of June 10, 2011, ch. 306, § 20.7, 2011 
Nev. Stat. 1665, 1683–84. 
 89. Mediation procedures must be followed, but in the event that they are not, parties can seek 
relief from the courts. See e.g., Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1282 (Nev. 2011). 
For example, when the foreclosing party fails to bring the required documents to the mediation 
and to have someone present at the mediation with the authority to modify the loan, the borrower 
has a right to petition the court for judicial review before foreclosure. Id.  
 90. On a federal level, the Obama administration’s loan modification plan has already saved an 
estimated $8.8 billion in monthly mortgage payments. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2011, at 1 (2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Sept 
%202011%20MHA%20Report_Final.pdf. Additionally, six months after entering the loan 
modification program, more than 94 percent of homeowners remain. Id. 
 91. Under its prior company policy, MERS “refuse[d] to disclose the owner of a note, and 
instead direct[ed] the homeowner to contact her loan servicer. If the servicer is unable or 
unwilling to disclose the requested information, the frustrated borrower is left with no way of 
identifying the equitable owner of her loan.” Robinson, supra note 13, at 1638. Although MERS 
claims to now disclose the identity of a loan’s owner to a borrower, whether MERS actually 
honors this new policy has not been determined. MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 34, at 
1.  
 92. Act of June 10, 2011, ch. 306, § 20.7, 2011 Nev. Stat. at 1683–84. 
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attending through a representative, have a person present with the authority 
to modify the loan or access to such a person.”93Additionally, as of 2010, all 
homeowners in New York are entitled to a similar process with a 
guaranteed settlement conference before the case can be referred to 
foreclosure.94 
While Nevada shields homeowners from otherwise entering the 
foreclosure process unaware of their opponent’s identity and without an 
opportunity to negotiate an alternative to foreclosure through mediation,95 
other states promote disclosure by requiring parties to record each transfer 
of an interest.96 Oregon takes such an approach and requires that 
assignments of trust deeds be “recorded in the mortgage records in the 
counties in which the property described in the deed is situated.”97 Idaho 
similarly calls for recording an assignment of the deed of trust in order to 
foreclose by advertisement and sale.98 Therefore, even if MERS will not 
reveal a mortgage owner’s identity,99 homeowners in danger of foreclosure 
in both Idaho and Oregon can consult local records and rely on them to find 
out who owns their mortgage.100 
Wyoming law adds one more consumer protection measure to those 
embraced in Idaho and Oregon by not only requiring all assignments to be 
recorded, but also that borrowers receive written notice of intent to 
foreclose by certified mail.101 The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld a 
foreclosure when the mortgage and any subsequent assignments were 
recorded and notice of the foreclosure was served on the delinquent 
homeowner.102 While these statutes do not place quite as many restrictions 
on the foreclosure process as the Massachusetts court decreed,103 they do 
protect borrowers by requiring a more transparent foreclosure process. In 
these states, borrowers have a guaranteed right to ascertain the identity of 
the mortgage note owner because ownership must be recorded in local 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Heredia-Bonnet v. First Am. Loanstar Tr. Servs., LLC, No. 56571, 2011 WL 5006303, at 
*1 (Nev. Oct. 18, 2011).  
 94. Mandatory Settlement Conference in Residential Foreclosure Actions, N.Y.C.P.L.R.  
§ 3408 (McKinney’s 2010). 
 95. Act of June 10, 2011, ch. 306, § 20.7, 2011 Nev. Stat. at 1683–84.  
 96. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735 (West 
2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505 (West 2011). 
 97. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735.  
 98. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505, cited in PHH Mortg. Serv. Corp. v. Perreira, 200 P.3d 1180, 
1196 (Idaho 2008) (finding that in a dispute over whether two trustees were separate legal entities, 
if such entities are legally separate, the deed must be recorded in one’s name in order for that 
person to execute the foreclosure). 
 99. See Phillips, supra note 19, at 264.  
 100. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735.  
 101. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103.  
 102. Bitker v. First Nat’l Bank in Evanston, 98 P.3d 853, 856 (Wyo. 2004) (citing WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 34-4-103).  
 103. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 2011) (requiring “proof that 
the assignment was made by a party that itself held the mortgage”). 
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records.104 By looking at the local records, the borrower has a name of the 
party that they can contact to attempt to negotiate a loan modification 
agreement and possibly avoid foreclosure altogether. 
Homeowners in California face an especially tenuous situation, as 
property owners in that state can have either mortgages or trusts,105 with 
varying recording requirements depending on the form of ownership. In 
theory, California joins Oregon, Idaho, and Wyoming by dictating that a 
mortgage assignee106 can exercise the power of sale “if the assignment is 
duly acknowledged and recorded.”107 However, no such protections apply 
to deeds of trust in California,108 and deeds of trust have become much 
more popular in that state over mortgages.109 Therefore, the pro-recordation 
law for mortgages has “become practically obsolete and [is] generally 
ignored by borrowers, creditors, and the California courts,”110 leaving 
borrowers in trust agreements without the guaranteed protection of being 
able to ascertain the deed’s owner in the county records. In this state, 
homeowners face some particularly difficult challenges in the foreclosure 
process due to the lack of restrictions on who can foreclose based upon trust 
agreements,111 the different forms of financing property acquisitions,112 and 
the state’s acceptance of the role MERS plays.113 
3. Lenient Foreclosure Procedures 
The last category includes states with few limitations on which entities 
can execute foreclosures. Florida114 has even more lax foreclosure standards 
than the MERS company itself.115 In Florida, a person “may be . . . entitled 
to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the 
instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument,”116 whereas the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735; IDAHO CODE ANN.  
§ 45-1505.  
 105. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 725a (West 1986). 
 106. Note: Mortgages are used in Wyoming, see § 34-4-103, but trusts are more common in 
both Idaho, see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505, and Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735.  
 107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5.  
 108. “Nothing in the comprehensive statutory scheme governing nonjudicial foreclosures . . . 
contains a requirement that OneWest’s assignment of the [deed of trust] to Fannie Mae must be 
acknowledged and recorded before the foreclosure sale . . . Section 2932.5 [requiring the 
recordation of mortgage assignments] is inapplicable.” Herrera v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc., 141 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 338 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 109. Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 821 (Ct. App. 2011).  
 110. Id.  
 111. For example, a California court said, “Notwithstanding that the right of sale is formally 
with the trustee, both the beneficiary and the trustee may commence the non-judicial foreclosure 
process.” Herrera, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 338. 
 112. Id. at 337–38. 
 113. See Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.3011 (West 2011). 
 115. In order to execute a foreclosure, the MERS company rules require that it properly possess 
the note. See Horstkamp, supra note 70, at 467. 
 116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.3011. 
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MERS company bylaws require MERS’s certifying officers to properly 
possess the note.117 Furthermore, while jurisdictions such as Idaho,118 
Oregon,119 and Wyoming120 have statutes mandating that each transfer must 
be recorded, in Florida recording is not a dispositive factor in considering 
whether a party has standing to bring a foreclosure action.121 
A few states have passed legislation specifically designed to 
accommodate MERS.122 In Minnesota, the legislature addressed the 
question of standing with the “MERS Statute” that specifically empowered 
nominees such as MERS to foreclose on mortgages.123 Further frustrating 
homeowner-borrower interests, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in 2009 
that these nominee mortgagees have no statutory requirement to record an 
assignment of the mortgage interest.124 
Kansas recently became more MERS-friendly with new foreclosure 
statutes that “recognize the reality of the MERS system and . . . confer 
rights on nominees such as MERS.”125 Previously, in Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, Inc. v. Graham, the Kansas court held that MERS 
foreclosures were invalid because “MERS acts ‘solely as nominee’ . . . 
[and] [t]here is no evidence that MERS has suffered any injury caused by 
Graham and Martinez’ failure to make payments on the promissory 
note.”126 One year later, however, the Kansas bankruptcy court reinterpreted 
Graham in In re Martinez, claiming that the Graham court did not 
completely bar MERS from bringing foreclosure actions but merely denied 
MERS standing because “there [was] no evidence that MERS received 
permission to act as an agent.”127 Based on the Martinez holding and the 
                                                                                                                 
 117. “[I]f a Member chooses to have MERS foreclose, the note must be endorsed in blank and 
in possession of one of the Member’s MERS Certifying Officers.” Horstkamp, supra note 70 at 
459. MERS’s June 2012 rules mark a strong departure from previous rules on two fronts and an 
even greater contrast with Florida’s requirements: MERS allegedly no longer holds notes nor 
brings foreclosure actions. MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 34, at 1.  
 118. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505 (West 2011). 
 119. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.735 (West 2011). 
 120. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103 (West 2011). 
 121. “Because Deutsche [Bank] possessed the original note and filed it with the circuit court, its 
standing may be established from its status as the note holder, regardless of any recorded 
assignments.” Harvey v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 69 So.3d 300, 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 122. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.413 (West 2004) (accounting for nominee mortgagees, 
just as in MERS); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-219 (West 2011) (requiring nominees to be joined to the 
litigation as a party). 
 123. “An assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose is . . . sufficient to 
assign, satisfy, release, or authorize the foreclosure of a mortgage if . . . a mortgage is granted to a 
mortgagee as nominee or agent.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.413.  
 124. See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 487 (Minn. 2009). 
 125. MADISON ET AL., supra note 51 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-219 (West 2011)).  
 126. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Graham, 247 P.3d 223, 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010). 
 127. In re Martinez, 444 B.R. 192, 204–05 (D. Kan. 2011) (interpreting Graham, 247 P.3d 
223). 
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new foreclosure statutes, Kansas now allows an agent to carry out a 
foreclosure as long as it has permission from the mortgage owner.128  
B. EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS LEAVE RECORDING UNTOUCHED 
The United States has a variety of laws in place to protect consumers129 
against the most obvious dangers in obtaining a mortgage. These laws 
address problems with higher cost loans, accurate disclosure of prices, and 
other predatory lending practices.130 Still, these reforms overlook the 
recording process, leaving homeowners without a right to learn who will 
execute the foreclosure proceeding against them. The federal laws also do 
not clarify the widely inconsistent state views on standing to foreclose, and 
whether MERS has authority to do so. 
One of the most important consumer financial protection laws, the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), was passed in 1968, initially as the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act.131 TILA’s 2008 Regulation Z amendment takes some 
steps to help consumers figure out who owns their mortgage. It provides 
that “no later than 30 calendar days after the date of transfer of a mortgage 
loan to a ‘covered person,’132 the covered person shall notify the consumer 
in writing, clearly and conspicuously” and provide various forms of 
identification information.133 However, TILA does not help all homeowners 
learn the identity of their mortgage’s owner because the statute does not 
apply to securitized mortgages, as only covered persons that acquire the 
entire interest must notify the consumer of the transfer.134 Thus, even under 
TILA, as amended in 2008, the securitized mortgages split and assigned to 
numerous mortgagees but recorded in the MERS database do not trigger 
consumer notification requirements.135 Even though it may have mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. The Kansas Court of Appeals again found that MERS needed permission to act as an 
agent, stating, “Because . . . there was no evidence that MERS received permission to act as an 
agent for the lender, this court held that MERS lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action.” U.S. 
Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 280 P.3d 225 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). 
 129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 226.1(b) (2006). For example, the statute states, “The purpose of 
this regulation is to promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its 
terms and cost.” Id.  
 130. See, e.g., id. (“The regulation provides for a fair and timely resolution of credit billing 
disputes . . . requires a maximum interest rate to be stated in the variable-rate contracts secured by 
the dwelling . . . [and] imposes limitations on home-equity plans.”).  
 131. OCC, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, 1 (2010) [hereinafter 
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK], available at http://www.occ.gov 
/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/truth-in-lending-handbook.pdf. 
 132. A person means “a natural person or an organization, including a corporation, partnership, 
proprietorship, association, cooperative, estate, trust, or government unit.” 15 U.S.C.A.  
§ 226.2(a)(22) (West 2006). 
 133. Id. § 226.39 (citation added).  
 134. Securitizing interests involves splitting the parts of one interest between multiple owners 
and re-pooling them with other interests; therefore, TILA has no protections for securitized 
mortgages because it excepts from its scope those entities that “acquire only a partial interest in 
the loan” as long as the borrower on the other side stays the same. Id. § 226.39(c)(3).  
 135. See id. 
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ownership information readily available, MERS escapes any duty to notify 
this significant population of borrowers under TILA. 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, another set of laws that 
protects consumers, only reaches parties involved in the actual home buying 
transaction.136 It mandates that financial institutions and independent 
mortgage bankers report data about the pricing of the loan and the 
borrower’s race, ethnicity, and income to the government.137 MERS, as a 
recording database, does not have the same liability under federal consumer 
protection statutes that other lenders have.138 Another federal statute, the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), does offer borrowers 
some protection with a disclosure requirement.139 The disclosure 
requirement mandates that borrowers receive notification when the loan 
servicing function is transferred.140 However, only the parties that effect the 
transfer are responsible for communicating such information, and MERS 
falls outside of this requirement because MERS does not actually have a 
stake in the transfer; it never holds or even services the mortgage, but rather 
only records the mortgage transfers.141 Additionally, RESPA’s disclosure 
requirement only covers loan servicing, and there is no such disclosure 
requirement when the actual ownership of the mortgage note is 
transferred.142 Therefore, RESPA does not help homeowners ascertain who 
will execute the foreclosure proceeding, especially in states that limit 
standing to do so to entities listed on the mortgage documents.143 
The most unsettling aspect of current federal statutes is that they leave 
MERS, a company with the same authority as banks to carry out acts with 
severe consequences such as foreclosures, essentially unregulated while 
banks and other lenders operate with strict consumer protection regulations 
and oversight. Currently, there exists the basic framework to address this 
issue. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, established pursuant to 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act),144 has streamlined requirements for mortgage application forms 
under existing Truth In Lending laws seeking consumer data.145 This 
Bureau has the untapped potential to regulate MERS, with the permission 
of the Federal Trade Commission, because MERS participates in the market 
                                                                                                                 
 136. OCC, HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 3–4 (2010). 
 137. Id. at 2. 
 138. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 1378.  
 139. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.21 (2010). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Phillips, supra note 19, at 263.  
 142. Id.  
 143. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). 
 144. Learn About the Bureau, supra note 55.  
 145. Id.  
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for consumer financial products and services.146 However, Congress has yet 
to recognize and address this problem.  
C. PROTECTIONS FROM CHARGES OF FRAUD 
Although no courts have found evidence of actual fraud to date, MERS 
nonetheless has employed questionable practices. MERS was allegedly 
“designed to operate within the existing legal framework in all U.S. 
jurisdictions.”147 However, MERS faced criticism when individuals who did 
not in fact work at the company acknowledged that they signed thousands 
of affidavits as “vice presidents”—without reading the case files148—as part 
of a practice generally known as robo-signing.149 When courts asked for the 
official mortgage note, MERS filed these bogus affidavits as evidence of 
ownership in order to carry out the foreclosure proceedings.150 
While MERS has not been successfully sued for the robo-signing or 
other suspect activities of the “vice presidents,”151 courts have voiced their 
concerns with the practice on a number of occasions. For example, Judge 
William Young, of Massachusetts’s District Court, opined, “This Court is 
deeply troubled that, with little to no oversight, individuals without any tie 
to or knowledge of the company on whose behalf they are acting may 
assign mortgages . . . .”152 However, that same judge also identified 
deficiencies in the legal system surrounding the practices: “As the MERS 
system demonstrates, even strict compliance with the statutory terms does 
nothing to ensure that real property is not conveyed fraudulently. 
Homeowner-mortgagors, as non-parties to the assignments of their 
mortgages, are left with little recourse where they suspect impropriety.”153 
Further supporting Judge Young’s suspicions, one individual who 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1024(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1987 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5514) (“The Bureau shall consult with the Federal Trade Commission prior to issuing a rule, in 
accordance with paragraph (1)(B), to define covered persons subject to this section.”). 
 147. Arnold, supra note 34, at 32, 35. 
 148. Norris, supra note 58.  
 149. Nathalie Tadena, Delaware Files Complaint Against Mortgage Registry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577002173640854262 
.html. 
 150. Norris, supra note 58; see also 60 Minutes: Mortgage Paperwork Mess: The Next Housing 
Shock (CBS television broadcast Apr. 3, 2011). While the broadcast does not specifically identify 
MERS by name, it provides photographs of these bogus affidavits that bear MERS’s title. Id. 
 151. For example, a judge in Brooklyn found it suspect that MERS uses these “vice presidents,” 
who also work for other banks, to assign mortgages between their other bank of employment and 
MERS, and he routinely required them to give details of their employment history and explain 
why a conflict of interest does not exist in those transactions. Bank of N.Y. v. Myers, 880 
N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S.2d 857, 872 
(Sup. Ct. 2010). However, MERS has not ultimately been held accountable for this in the courts, 
as the appellate judges did not agree that explanations for such behavior needed to be submitted. 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Betts, 888 N.Y.S.2d 203, 204 (App. Div. 2009).  
 152. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 374 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 153. Id. at 378.  
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personally discussed legal issues with members of the MERS company 
said, “So far as anyone can tell their real theory was: ‘If we can get 
everyone on board, no judge will want to upend something that is 
reasonable and sensible and would screw up 70 percent of loans.’”154 
MERS has also exploited uncertainty in the judicial system to obtain 
favorable outcomes. In one case, MERS itself used the same argument 
advanced by borrowers in foreclosure actions and argued that it did not 
have the same power as a mortgage owner.155 MERS’s winning claim 
allowed the organization to avoid the license and registration requirements 
in place for banks in Nebraska.156 The court held that “MERS has no 
independent right to collect on any debt because MERS itself has not 
extended credit, and none of the mortgage debtors owe MERS any 
money.”157 While MERS often stresses its similarities to mortgage owners 
in court in order to get the authority to foreclose on borrowers, it has also 
highlighted its differences from lenders158 when convenient to the company. 
Recently, some states have begun taking harsher stances against such 
fraudulent practices as robo-signing. The state of Nevada recently took a 
particularly aggressive stance against robo-signing by criminally indicting 
two title officers.159 The officers faced more than 600 charges for ordering 
employees to forge their names on foreclosure paperwork and then notarize 
the signatures.160 However, although it offers a new opportunity to harshly 
punish robo-signing, the Nevada case only threatens two individuals and 
not the corporation, and therefore does not go far enough to change the 
broader institutional problem of robo-signing. 
Nevada is not the only state to initiate litigation against MERS to 
combat its questionable business practices. In October 2011, Delaware 
Attorney General Beau Biden filed a lawsuit against MERS, claiming that 
the organization “knowingly obscured information from borrowers,” 
submitted inaccurate information to courts in order to get standing, and 
used “robo-signed” documents.161 Attorney General Biden’s suit holds the 
promise of more consumer-friendly foreclosure practices going forward, as 
it seeks to enjoin MERS from initiating foreclosures in the state and to 
                                                                                                                 
 154. The authors also noted that no one did an in-depth study of the individual state laws, and 
also lobbied Congress to be excluded from regulation legislation during the 1990s. Powell & 
Morgenson, supra note 5.  
 155. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Neb. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784, 
788 (Neb. 2005). 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. See generally id. at 784 (winning claim that MERS is not a “mortgage banker” and not 
subject to licensure requirements).  
 159. Ruth Simon, Nevada Grand Jury Indicts Two in Alleged Robo-Signing Scheme, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203699404577042961074968 
218.html. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Tadena, supra note 149.  
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require that MERS record the correct chain of title with the counties.162 
However, in the past, Delaware has not been particularly receptive to 
homeowners’ claims of fraud against MERS. In one case, the court refused 
to pierce the corporate veil when plaintiff-borrowers alleged that MERS 
improperly overcharged them, as well as millions of other mortgagors, for 
attorneys’ fees.163 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to “plead facts 
that would give rise to an inference that the Shareholder Defendants, 
through their alter ego, [had] created ‘a sham entity designed to defraud 
investors and creditors.’”164 
New lawsuits at local and state levels contend that the very essence of 
the MERS operation is fraudulent because it does not properly record land 
transfers.165 In Massachusetts, Attorney General Martha Coakley recently 
initiated a lawsuit against major banks for various unfair practices against 
consumers.166 She included MERS as a defendant in the suit, claiming that 
the company “‘corrupted’ the state’s public land recording system by not 
registering legal transfers properly.”167 At the local level, a county official 
in Pennsylvania sued MERS claiming that their electronic system allowed 
parties in real estate deals to circumvent state laws that require recording 
with the county, and that these practices have cost Pennsylvania more than 
$100 million in forgone recordation fees.168 
Importantly, however, even if this current litigation proves successful, 
the resulting changes in the foreclosure practices of these jurisdictions do 
not guarantee to alleviate consumers’ confusion throughout the rest of the 
country. 
III. PROPOSED CHANGES 
The opaque nature and unregulated status of MERS, combined with its 
uncertain powers as a recording company, leave homeowner-borrowers in a 
legal quagmire. To combat the uncertainty surrounding the entire 
foreclosure process and to address these specific issues, the United States 
needs sweeping federal consumer financial legislation that: (1) establishes 
uniform standing requirements; (2) compels MERS to open its records to 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Karen Freifeld & Aruna Viswanatha, MERS Subpoenaed by New York, Sued by Delaware, 
REUTERS, (Oct. 27, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/27/us-mers 
-subpoena-idUSTRE79Q7SD20111027. 
 163. Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (D. Del. 2008). 
 164. Id. at 531.  
 165. Gretchen Morgenson, Massachusetts Sues 5 Major Banks Over Foreclosure Practices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/business/major-banks-face-new 
-foreclosure-suit.html; PA County Official Sues Firm Over Mortgage Recording System, 17 NO. 
15 WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIAB. 1, 1–2 (Dec. 5, 2011). 
 166. Morgenson, supra note 165.  
 167. Id.  
 168. PA County Official Sues Firm Over Mortgage Recording System, supra note 165.  
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borrowers; and (3) ensures that MERS complies with the previous two 
tenets. 
A. FEDERAL LAW MUST ARTICULATE A UNIFORM STANDARD FOR 
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS 
First, the state courts have radically different ways of approaching 
foreclosures executed by MERS. A uniform standing rule applied evenly 
throughout the country169 would not only clarify the procedure for MERS 
itself, as the company allegedly does not pay close attention to local state 
regulations,170 but would also ease the uncertainties of the borrowers and 
those who may subsequently purchase the foreclosed property. Establishing 
one standard for foreclosure standing will help Americans in all 
jurisdictions to navigate the already complicated and devastating 
foreclosure process. Exasperating this problem, the courts not only differ in 
their standing requirements between the states,171 but also change their 
positions within a single state.172 With clear standing requirements, 
recipients of foreclosure notices would know that the foreclosure will go 
through. This allows the recipient to dedicate their time and resources to 
negotiating a better loan agreement, fighting the merits of the foreclosure, 
or finding a new place to live, instead of disputing the procedural aspects of 
the foreclosure such as standing. Even if a borrower wins the standing 
dispute, he might still face a foreclosure action—if only brought by another 
                                                                                                                 
 169. The authority to pass these regulations falls under Congress’s interstate commerce powers, 
as MERS, holder of so many mortgages, has a major impact on real estate markets throughout the 
nation. Powell & Morgenson, supra note 5. Furthermore, in the past, the Supreme Court has held 
that Congress can regulate local activities that are part of a “class of activities” that affect supply 
and demand in the national market. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). The Federal 
Controlled Substances Act was constitutional in proscribing Raich from growing marijuana for 
personal medical use in compliance with local California law because marijuana is part of a 
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Americans’ housing on a national level. For example, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the 
Supreme Court allowed Congress to regulate racial discrimination in private rental and sales real 
estate markets, claiming that such discrimination was a “badge[] and incident[] of slavery” even 
one hundred years after the Civil War. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439–41 
(1968). While conditions today do not match the intensity of those issues in the housing market of 
1968, a court might be able to stretch that ruling to find legislation that preserves peoples’ homes 
on a major constitutional scale. 
 170. Powell & Morgenson, supra note 5.  
 171. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 50 (Mass. 2011) (finding that 
only the mortgagee or a person properly assigned the mortgage can carry out a foreclosure sale). 
But see Harvey v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 69 So.3d 300, 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that a bank has standing to foreclose simply because it holds the note “regardless of any 
assignments”). 
 172. MADISON ET AL., supra note 51.  
270 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
party. Finally, through this regulation, the government can ease 
overburdened court dockets,173 as judges will not have to dedicate their 
scarce time and resources to adjudicate party standing. 
B. FEDERAL LAW MUST COMPEL MERS TO OPEN ITS BOOKS 
Second, the legislation should compel MERS to open its records to the 
public—or at least to the relevant borrower. MERS has the resources to 
track mortgage ownership through its electronic system, and that system has 
undoubtedly benefitted many actors involved in real estate.174 By providing 
these records, the system could also support the vast numbers of 
homeowners confused about who owns their mortgage. 
The federal government recognizes the significant financial impact of 
home ownership and has responded accordingly with protective legislation 
on the front end of acquiring a mortgage, for example, by requiring brokers 
to use understandable forms.175 On the back end, where consumers are also 
vulnerable, the federal government must pass legislation protecting 
borrowers in danger of losing their homes, as American tradition has 
resisted unfairly depriving individuals of their property.176 Requiring MERS 
to disclose the mortgage owner’s name will allow the borrower to identify 
the owner and attempt negotiations to avoid foreclosure. For example, if a 
borrower facing foreclosure wanted to contact the owner of his mortgage 
note to arrange a new payment plan as a possible alternative to losing his 
house, he could go to the local county records office to ascertain the 
owner’s identity. However, most county records simply list “MERS” in 
their database,177 and while MERS probably has the owner’s identity in its 
system, it has no obligation to reveal the owner’s identity without a court 
order.178 This results in significant frustration for the borrower in efforts to 
modify his payment plan, especially if he is facing imminent foreclosure. 
Nevada has found loan modification negotiations so helpful to borrowers 
that the statute requires such negotiations before a foreclosure can be 
executed.179 Such negotiations, as an alternative to foreclosures, can 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Streitfield, supra note 61.  
 174. MERS easily provides information about mortgage ownership if required to in court 
proceedings. Peterson, supra note 8, at 1378. MERS has made transfers more convenient by 
offering a speedier recording alternative to that offered by the county. Phillips, supra note 19, at 
264.  
 175. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 131.  
 176. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting property from “unreasonable searches and 
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is the owner. And county recorders are recording documents that say MERS – over and over and 
over and over again.” Collard, supra note 7.  
 178. Peterson, supra note 8, 1378.  
 179. Act of June 10, 2011, ch. 306, § 20.7, 2011 Nev. Stat. 1665, 1683–84. 
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potentially ease docket pressures and save both MERS and borrowers 
money by avoiding the foreclosure process altogether. 
C. ENFORCEMENT 
Third, a government agency must ensure that MERS does indeed open 
its books and abide by the proper, uniform standing requirements in 
foreclosure proceedings that this new law will require. The newly 
established180 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is the 
appropriate and best positioned agency to ensure that MERS complies with 
the new statute, as the agency is specifically aimed at protecting consumers 
in their interactions with providers of financial products and services.181 
MERS, a financial service provider, should be included in the CFPB’s 
purview. 
However, saddling the young agency with the task of policing such a 
prominent force in the foreclosure arena might not achieve the most 
favorable results for consumers, since the CFPB is new182 and does not have 
any longstanding traditions of prosecuting corporations that violate 
consumer protection laws. Yet, because of the vast scale of the foreclosure 
crisis in America, the CFPB can possibly grow to address such widespread 
problems. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) does, however, have a 
long history of protecting consumers from predatory advertising and sales 
practices.183 While the FTC derives most of its enforcement power from the 
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,184 the Dodd-Frank Act provides 
that the CFPB and FTC must coordinate their efforts to police compliance 
with federal consumer financial legislation.185 This allows the FTC to act as 
an alternative enforcer in the event that the CFPB fails to adequately 
monitor MERS. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also guarantees that an entity will not 
simultaneously face unduly harsh punishment from the agencies, as it 
permits only one to pursue a claim at a time.186 The Dodd-Frank Act 
                                                                                                                 
 180. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was established in 2011 as part of the Dodd-
Frank Act. Learn About the Bureau, supra note 55.  
 181. Id.  
 182. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was established in 2011. Id.  
 183. The FTC was formed in 1914, and has been protecting consumers ever since that time. 
About the Federal Trade Commission, FTC, http://ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2011). 
 184. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law 
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 185. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1024(c)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1989 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). Additionally, the FTC and CFPB have entered into a memorandum of 
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 186. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(c)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). 
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empowers the CFPB to levy sanctions against entities that violate federal 
consumer financial statutes.187 By including MERS within the definition of 
a mortgage-related business under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB would be 
able to enforce compliance with the proposed legislation. 
Currently, the CFPB can “examine . . . all mortgage-related 
businesses.”188 However, MERS does not automatically fall within this 
category because it is considered a recording company. The Dodd-Frank 
Act provides that the CFPB can supervise three types of entities: (1) 
nondepository covered persons; (2) very large banks, savings associations, 
and credit unions; and (3) other banks, savings associations, and credit 
unions.189 Because MERS does not actually provide loan servicing, does not 
originate loans, and is not a bank, it is not really a “nondepository” entity 
subject to Dodd-Frank regulation.190 However, the “nondepository” 
category is elastic, as Dodd-Frank provides that the CFPB, after consulting 
the FTC,191 can also reach businesses that are “larger participant[s] of a 
market for other consumer financial products or services.”192 
If interpreted flexibly, MERS should fall into this category. Thus, 
assuming that the CFPB consults the FTC and defines MERS as a “covered 
person,” the Dodd-Frank Act sufficiently empowers the CFPB193 to ensure 
that MERS will comply with the proposed requirements of disclosure and 
proper foreclosure practices. Broadly, the Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFPB 
the general power to “collect, investigate, and respond to consumer 
complaints.”194 This authorization provides critical on-the-ground 
enforcement powers. 
First, the legislation requires the CFPB to conduct regular examinations 
of covered entities to make sure that they follow federal consumer financial 
laws and to detect any participation in risky activities.195 The CFPB is also 
empowered to study the risks that a covered person might pose to 
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(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511, 5514, 5515, 5516).   
 190. The “nondepository” entities covered by Dodd-Frank include any business that “offers or 
provides origination, brokerage, or servicing of loans,” “is a larger participant of a market for 
other consumer financial products or services,” is a “covered [entity] . . . engaging . . . in conduct 
that poses risks to consumers,” “offers or provides to a consumer any private education loan,” or 
“offers or provides to a consumer a pay-day loan.” Id. § 1024(a)(1)(A)–(E), 124 Stat. at 1987 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).  
 191. Id. § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).  
 192. Id. § 1024(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).  
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 195. Id. § 1024(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).  
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consumers in a particular geographic area,196 which will be especially 
helpful in the case of MERS because of the company’s widely varying 
practices in different state jurisdictions. 
Second, in addition to examining these entities, the CFPB can “impose 
fines or ask courts to order relief.”197 The CFPB can hold its own hearing198 
after investigating a possible violation of federal consumer financial 
protection laws, and within ninety days, make a decision.199 The CFPB can 
also address situations that need more immediate attention, such as 
foreclosure proceedings, by issuing cease and desist orders, which take 
effect within thirty days.200 The losing party may appeal the CFPB’s 
decision to the court of appeals in their jurisdiction.201 While these 
administrative proceedings cannot result in exemplary or punitive damages 
for defendants,202 possible remedies might include “rescission or 
reformation of contracts; refund of moneys or return of real property; 
restitution; disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment; payment 
of damages or other monetary relief; public notification . . . ; limits on the 
activities . . . of the person; and civil money203 penalties.”204 
Third, aside from administrative proceedings, the CFPB can, upon 
notifying the Attorney General,205 also prosecute a violation of federal 
consumer financial law in civil court for both legal and equitable relief.206 
The CFPB can bring these proceedings in either a U.S. district court or any 
appropriate state court where the defendant resides or does business.207 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Some may argue that national legislation is not necessary because, 
according to MERS’s 2012 internal rules, the company claims that it will 
not pursue foreclosure actions and will allow homeowners to access loan 
ownership information.208 However, MERS has dramatically changed its 
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policies,209 indicating that any internal regulation from the company may 
not be reliable and can easily change. Additionally, considering how 
lengthy foreclosure litigation can be,210 there are still a number of cases on 
the dockets with MERS as plaintiff. Finally, MERS’s history of engaging in 
unethical and probably fraudulent practices211 necessitates government 
regulation, no matter how the company has modified its behavior.  
Recent legal scholarship suggests amending both state and federal 
legislation to include supervision of MERS.212 However, new state laws 
will do little to clarify the already non-uniform foreclosure laws for 
homeowners throughout the states. Others suggest that Congress should 
establish uniform federal standing requirements and empower the loan 
servicer to modify loan terms.213 Under current federal law, the borrower 
must be notified of the servicer’s identity, but not that of the loan owner.214 
However, in the actual foreclosure proceedings, homeowners face the 
owner of the mortgage, not the servicer;215 so, the consumer would benefit 
only from negotiating with that owner, whose identity MERS may 
obscure.216 Therefore, in some states it would be in the consumer’s best 
interest to negotiate with only the mortgage-owning entity, since only that 
entity can carry out the foreclosure.217 
Additionally, some contend that the best solution is to nationalize the 
mortgage recording system altogether,218 but because of its contentious 
political environment, such a dramatic proposal has little chance of 
succeeding.219 Furthermore, if MERS was nationalized as a recording 
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agency and continued to exercise foreclosures, the entity would expose 
itself to an entirely new claim for lawsuits: violations of the Due Process 
Clause.220 
CONCLUSION 
When MERS streamlined the laborious task, previously reserved to the 
county clerk’s office, of manually recording deeds and mortgages by 
creating a new digital system, the loan application process became easier 
for everyone involved.221 At the peak of the housing boom, banks could, 
and frequently did, transfer a mortgage or even a piece of a mortgage to 
other banks almost instantaneously by recording with MERS instead of in 
the public land records.222 
This formerly government-run operation, nearly taken over by a single 
private corporation with especially opaque business practices, continued in 
its new electronic form for years without any sort of formal federal 
regulation. When numerous borrowers could not pay their mortgages 
subsequent to the 2008 economic meltdown, it became evident that 
MERS’s electronic recording and transfer system, while expedient, only 
facilitated increased confusion over mortgage ownership due to the 
company’s aim to help move as many mortgages as possible223 
unbeknownst to borrowers. Adding to borrowers’ confusion, MERS, though 
not the true owner of the mortgage,224 often initiated foreclosure 
proceedings. 
Recognizing the difficulties facing homeowners, courts in some states, 
such as Massachusetts, have recently held that a foreclosure must be 
executed by a company named in the official papers as the mortgage 
holder.225 Massachusetts’s holding threatens MERS’s ability to foreclose 
since MERS does not hold mortgages.226 Many other states, however, do 
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not have such strict requirements about standing to bring a foreclosure 
action.227 
The federal statute proposed in this note would provide for a uniform 
standing requirement that clearly defines when a party has the ability to 
foreclose. Between the lack of federal regulation and quasi-fraudulent 
activities of MERS, the federal government should pass legislation to 
regulate this company in its exercise of what was traditionally a government 
function: recording mortgages. With physical recording of each transfer 
much less common at the county office,228 borrowers on the MERS registry 
can only determine who owns their mortgage at the discretion of the MERS 
company.229 The proposed federal statute mandates that MERS disclose 
their records—at least to the mortgagor on the other end. This would 
provide borrowers with a right to know who owns their mortgage, which 
would help to ensure that losing their property is only the last resort. In the 
event of noncompliance, the legislation must also provide the CFPB or FTC 
with authority to impose sanctions. With this legislation, MERS can not 
only return to its roots as a celebrated digital recording company that 
expedites the transfer process,230 but will also guarantee clarified mortgage 
ownership, hopefully resulting in less pressure on the court systems, more 
informed borrowers, and fewer foreclosures. 
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